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The Constitutionality of Laws Banning Physician 
Assisted Suicide 
Richard S. Myers* 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
The United States Supreme Court seemed to have settled the 
constitutionality of laws banning physician assisted suicide in its 1997 
decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg2 and Vacco v. Quill.3 Ober-
gefell v. Hodges,4 the Court’s same-sex marriage decision, has, how-
ever, raised concerns that the Court might be prepared to revisit 
Glucksberg and Quill.5 Obergefell reaffirmed the Court’s commit-
ment to an expansive understanding of substantive due process, and 
suggests that the Court, if given an opportunity, will overrule Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill, although this is not inevita-
ble.6 
In considering this issue, though, it is important to revisit deci-
sions from several decades ago when courts allowed patients to with-
draw medical treatment, even when the withdrawal was intended to 
shorten the life of the patient. These cases typically claimed that they 
were not approving a right to die or a right to assisted suicide. But 
these decisions rejected the sanctity-of-life ethic that had long been a 
part of our law and also emphasized the radical autonomy perspective 
that the Supreme Court has relied upon in substantive due process 
 
* Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. This article is an expanded version of a talk pre-
sented on October 14, 2016 at a symposium on assisted suicide held at J. Reuben Clark Law 
School, Brigham Young University. 
 1. This article draws from several previously published articles of mine. See Richard S. 
Myers, Obergefell and the Future of Substantive Due Process, 14 AVE MARIA L. REV. 54 
(2016) [hereinafter Myers, Obergefell]; Richard S. Myers, Re-reading Roe v. Wade, 71 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1025 (2014) [hereinafter Myers, Roe]; Richard S. Myers, Pope John Paul II, 
Freedom, and Constitutional Law, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 61 (2007); Richard S. Myers, The 
End of Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (1988) [hereinafter Myers, 
Due Process]. To avoid multiplying footnotes, I will not always indicate when I have drawn 
from these articles.   
 2. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
 3. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).  
 4. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 5. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 65–70. 
 6. Id.  
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cases such as Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,7 Lawrence v. Texas,8 and Obergefell v. Hodges.9 
These withdrawal-of-treatment cases preserved a line between 
passive and active measures to terminate the life of patients, and so 
the decisions did not approve physician assisted suicide or euthanasia. 
But the distinctions the courts drew were more practical than logical. 
There is a very thin line between many of these withdrawal-of-
treatment cases and a right to assisted suicide. 
Since 1997, when the Court rejected constitutional challenges to 
laws banning assisted suicide, there has been a slow but discernible 
move in favor of assisted suicide. This is certainly true in some for-
eign countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada. This is 
also true in the United States, where assisted suicide is now legal in 
several states, including importantly California. Other cultural trends 
also favor the legalization of assisted suicide. I think the Supreme 
Court, if given an opportunity, will rely on these developments and 
Obergefell’s reaffirmation of the autonomy perspective and strike 
down state laws banning physician assisted suicide. 
This is by no means inevitable. Those who oppose physician as-
sisted suicide still have an opportunity to express their views in the 
democratic process and to help rebuild cultural support for the sanc-
tity of life perspective. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
As noted above, the constitutionality of laws banning physician 
assisted suicide seems to have been settled by the Court’s 1997 deci-
sions in Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. In those cas-
es, the Court rejected the idea that there is a fundamental right to as-
sisted suicide.10 In so doing, the Court refused to rely on the radical 
 
 7. 505 U.S. 833, 846–53 (1992). For commentary on Casey, see Richard S. Myers, Re-
flections on the Twentieth Anniversary of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, in LIFE AND 
LEARNING XXII: THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR 
LIFE CONFERENCE (Joseph W. Koterski, ed.) (forthcoming), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150241. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003).  
 8. 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).   
 9. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 10. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). In Vacco v. Quill, the Court 
rejected an equal protection argument. The Court agreed that there is a difference between 
letting a patient die (by refusing life-saving medical treatment) and killing a patient (by assisting 
in the patient’s suicide). According to the Court, “[l]ogic and contemporary practice support 
New York’s judgment that the two acts are different, and New York may therefore, consistent 
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autonomy perspective articulated in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,11 and instead inquired whether there 
was any support for the view that a right to assisted suicide was deep-
ly rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition. The Court carefully 
reviewed the relevant history and stated: 
[W]e are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradi-
tion that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicit-
ly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent 
adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries 
of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy 
choice of almost every State.12  
In Glucksberg, unlike in Roe v. Wade13 or in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
the Court was unwilling to take that step. 
The Glucksberg Court’s approach to substantive due process be-
came the governing standard, despite the Court’s decision in Law-
rence v. Texas.14 The Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges seems 
to change this. In supporting same-sex marriage, the Obergefell 
Court principally relied on the doctrine of substantive due process.15 
The Court rejected Glucksberg’s historical approach to substantive 
due process and relied rather on its own understanding of the nature 
of liberty. This understanding emphasizes respect for individual au-
tonomy and self-determination and choice, at least when the conduct 
 
with the Constitution, treat them differently. By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medi-
cal treatment[,] while prohibiting anyone from assisting a suicide, New York law follows a 
longstanding and rational distinction.” 521 U.S. at 808.   
 11. In Casey, the joint opinion stated: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. at 851. One commentator fairly stated that the Court had adopted the view that 
moral relativism was a constitutional command. See Steven Gey, Is Moral Relativism a Consti-
tutional Command?, 70 IND. L. J. 331 (1995). Gey stated: “[T]he typical focus on the mechan-
ics of Casey and Roe has unfortunately overshadowed the fact that a very conservative Supreme 
Court has strongly reaffirmed the principle that moral autonomy is the philosophical basis for 
the constitutional privacy right.” Id. at 363. 
 12. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723. 
 13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For commentary on Roe, see Myers, Roe, supra note 1. 
 14. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Lawrence seemed to revive the broader, more expansive ap-
proach to substantive due process. The Court relied upon the “mystery passage” from Casey 
and extolled the idea of moral autonomy. The Lawrence Court did not even cite Glucksberg. 
Yet, despite all of this, Glucksberg, with its emphasis on history and tradition, seemed to re-
main the dominant approach to substantive due process. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 
60–61 (discussing this point).  
 15. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). The Court did cite both due 
process and equal protection, yet it seems clear that liberty and autonomy are doing most of the 
work. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 61 n. 52. 
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involved, the Court said, “the rights of two consenting adults whose 
marriage[] would pose no risk of harm to themselves or third par-
ties.”16 The dissenters complained, with some justification, that the 
Court had effectively overruled Glucksberg’s approach to substantive 
due process.17 
Obergefell seems to be an effort to cement the Court’s broad ap-
proach to substantive due process. The Court’s analysis was uncon-
strained by history or a careful description of the right or even an as-
sessment of emerging trends. The Court’s focus was more on its own 
reflections on the nature of liberty and its own discernment of new 
insights and societal understandings about “what freedom is and must 
become.”18 The Court’s understanding is an endorsement of the “au-
tonomy of self” the Court celebrated in Lawrence19 and of the “mys-
tery passage” of Casey.20 The Court seems to have concluded that 
while “[t]he [Fourteenth] Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics[],”21 it does enact John Stuart Mill’s On Lib-
erty.22 
It is not clear where this will lead. There has been much specula-
tion about Obergefell’s potential impact on issues such as polygamy.23 
My focus here is on Obergefell’s potential impact on cases challeng-
ing state laws banning assisted suicide. Since Obergefell, there have 
been a couple of state court decisions discussing the constitutionality 
of laws banning assisted suicide. In Morris v. Brandenburg,24 the Su-
 
 16. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607.  
 17. Chief Justice Roberts stated: “[T]he majority’s position requires it to effectively 
overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of substantive due process.” 
Id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 18. Id. at 2603.  
 19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 20. See supra note 11. 
 21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled in 
part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).   
 22. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent stated “the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact 
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty any more than it enacts Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” Ober-
gefell, 135 S. Ct. 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). This comparison is a staple in the literature. 
See Myers, Due Process, supra note 1, at 604, n. 278. 
 23. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 55 n. 5, 64–65. 
 24. Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016). In Morris, the trial court had 
legalized assisted suicide in an opinion that rested on the autonomy rationale. The New Mexico 
Court of Appeals reversed this decision by a 2-1 vote. 356 P.3d 564 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015). The 
two judges in the majority thought, rather implausibly, that Obergefell had endorsed Glucks-
berg. For discussion of this point, see Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 67 n. 104. The dissent 
thought that Glucksberg had been effectively overruled. The dissent thought it was most ap-
propriate to adopt “the view of liberty, autonomy, and privacy elucidated in the Ca-
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preme Court of New Mexico upheld the constitutionality of a law 
banning assisted suicide. In Myers v. Scheiderman,25 an intermediate 
appellate court in New York did the same thing. Although both deci-
sions were based on state constitutional law, Glucksberg had a signif-
icant effect on both opinions. The courts seemed influenced by the 
longstanding and still largely persisting tradition in the law opposing 
assisted suicide. Both courts emphasized the need for judicial re-
straint.26 
These state court decisions are important but I do not think they 
tell us much about how the United States Supreme Court will ap-
proach the issue if afforded an opportunity. I think we are witnessing 
the same sort of reaction that we saw in the lower courts after Casey 
and Lawrence. After these decisions, lower courts were, for the most 
part, rather cautious about expanding the scope of substantive due 
process.27 These courts seemed inclined to let the United States Su-
preme Court extend the reasoning of those cases into new areas. I 
think that the Supreme Court will be all too willing to do just that if 
it is given an opportunity to revisit Glucksberg.28 
In so doing, I think the Court will emphasize the “autonomy of 
self” philosophy and conclude that ending one’s own life is the ulti-
mate act of self-determination.29 The Court will also likely reject the 
state’s interest in preserving life because it will likely conclude that it 
violates autonomy to second-guess an individual’s own subjective as-
sessment of the value of her life.30 
The Court will likely emphasize the slow but discernible trend in 
favor of assisted suicide.31 At the time of Glucksberg, physician assist-
 
sey/Lawrence/Obergefell line of cases” and found that under this approach the New Mexico 
law was unconstitutional. Morris, 356 P.3d at 601 (Vanzi, J., dissenting). 
 25. Myers v. Schneiderman, 31 N.Y.S.3d 45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).   
 26. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 67–68 (discussing these opinions). As I have 
explored, there are real benefits to courts exercising judicial humility on issues of this complexi-
ty and importance. See Richard S. Myers, The Virtue of Judicial Humility, 13 AVE MARIA L. 
REV. 207 (2015) [hereinafter Myers, Virtue].  
 27. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 57–61. 
 28. See id. at 65–70. 
 29. Id. at 68. 
 30. Id. 
 31. In defining the scope of substantive due process, the Court sometimes relies upon its 
assessments of social trends. For example, in Lawrence, the Court emphasized that its analysis 
of recent history demonstrated “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection 
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).   
MYERS.MACRO.3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2017  8:36 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
400 
ed suicide had not yet been legalized in any state in the country.32 
Physician assisted suicide is now legal in Oregon, Washington, Ver-
mont, Montana, California, Colorado, and Washington, D.C..33 In-
ternational trends have also moved in favor of assisted suicide. The 
countries leading the way (the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada) 
were the same countries that led the way in legalizing same-sex mar-
riage.34 I should note that these developments in the states and in 
other countries have not moved in a straight line. Some states have 
rejected proposals to legalize assisted suicide or have strengthened 
laws banning assisted suicide.35 And certain countries have rejected 
efforts to legalize assisted suicide.36 There is, though, a slow trend in 
favor of legalization. Moreover, public opinion seems to be moving in 
favor of assisted suicide in the last few years, after a long period of 
relative stability on the issue.37 
III. WITHDRAWAL CASES 
If the Court revisits the constitutionality of laws banning assisted 
suicide, older decisions such as Bouvia38 (in California), Brophy39 (in 
 
 32. Oregon’s law did not go into effect until October of 1997, several months after 
Glucksberg was decided.  
 33. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 66 (noting state developments in Oregon, 
Washington, Vermont, Montana, and California). Colorado legalized assisted suicide in the 
November 2016 election. Jennifer Brown, Colorado Passes Medical Aid in Dying, Joining 5 
Other States, DENV. POST (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:40 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/ 
11/08/colorado-aid-in-dying-proposition-106-election-results/. The District of Columbia City 
Council has also legalized assisted suicide, which is now in effect. Micaiah Bilger, Washington 
D.C. Becomes 6th Place in the U.S. to Legalize Assisted Suicide, LIFE NEWS, (Feb. 20, 2017, 
11:05 AM), http://www.lifenews.com/2017/02/20/washington-d-c-becomes-6th-place-in-the-
u-s-to-legalize-assisted-suicide/.   
 34. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 65–66.  
 35. See, e.g., Wesley J. Smith, Ohio Making Assisted Suicide a Felony, THE CORNER 
(Dec. 12, 2016, 9:50 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/442967/ohio-making-
assisted-suicide-felony (noting that Ohio made assisted suicide a felony in December 2016).  
 36. South Australia rejected an effort to legalize assisted suicide in November of 2016, 
Michael Cook, Assisted Suicide Narrowly Defeated in South Australia, NRL NEWS TODAY 
(Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.nationalrighttolifenews.org/news/2016/11/assisted-suicide-
narrowly-defeated-in-south-australia/#.WFRO8vwizIU. And, on December 6, 2016, the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of South Africa rejected a constitutional challenge to the law banning 
assisted suicide. Richard Myers, Supreme Court of South Africa Rejects Lower Court Decision 
Allowing Assisted Suicide/Euthanasia, UNIV. FACULTY FOR LIFE BLOG (Dec. 12, 2016, 11:52 
AM), http://www.uffl.org/blog/2016/12/12/supreme-court-of-south-africa-rejects-lower-court-
decision-allowing-assisted-suicideeuthanasia/. 
 37. See Myers, Obergefell, supra note 1, at 66 (noting polling data).  
 38. See Bouvia v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In 
Bouvia, the court permitted Elizabeth Bouvia, a competent, 28 year-old quadriplegic with se-
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Massachusetts), Browning40 (in Florida), and Bland41 (in England), 
will also likely prove important. The withdrawal of treatment area is 
complicated and I should hasten to add there are many cases when 
the withdrawal of treatment is appropriate.42 But the cases involving 
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration are particularly trouble-
some, although in certain instances the withdrawal of nutrition and 
hydration is permissible.43 
 
vere disabilities, to withdraw the food and water that were sustaining her life. The appellate 
court faulted the lower court for failing to give appropriate weight to the quality of her life. 
The appellate court endorsed the idea that it had to respect her view that “the quality of her life 
has been diminished to the point of hopelessness, uselessness, unenjoyability and frustration. 
She, as the patient, lying helplessly in bed, unable to care for herself, may consider her existence 
meaningless. She can’t be faulted for so concluding. Id. at 1142. The court further noted that it 
had to respect Bouvia’s choice to consider that her “life has been physically destroyed and its 
quality, dignity and purpose gone . . . .” Id. at 1143.   
 39. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986). In 
Brophy, the court allowed Paul Brophy’s guardian to permit the withdrawal of artificially ad-
ministered nutrition and hydration. Brophy had been diagnosed as in a persistent vegetative 
state and had previously expressed his desire not to be maintained in such a condition. The 
court emphasized the importance of individual autonomy, even when the individual’s choice 
would be exercised by another through substituted judgment. The state’s interest in preserving 
life was not weighty enough to override the choice to continue treatment.   
 40. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990). In Browning, the 
court considered the following question: “Whether the guardian of a patient who is incompe-
tent but not in a permanent vegetative state and who suffers from an incurable but not terminal 
condition, may exercise the patient’s right of self-determination to forego sustenance provided 
artificially by a nasogastric tube?” Id. at 7–8. The court largely endorsed this view. The court 
rejected the state interests that were claimed to outweigh the right to forego treatment. The 
state’s interest in preserving life was insufficient, primarily because Browning’s affliction was 
not curable and the state’s only interest was in briefly maintaining her life. The state’s interest 
in preventing suicide was not implicated, the court stated, because “the discontinuation of life 
support ‘in fact will merely result in [her] death, if at all, from natural causes.’” Id. at 14. 
 41. See Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789. Bland involved a patient who had 
been diagnosed in a persistent vegetative state. Bland’s family and his attending physicians 
sought permission to withdraw artificially administered food and water, which was ultimately 
granted by the House of Lords. For commentary on Bland, see J.M. Finnis, Bland: Crossing the 
Rubicon?, 109 LAW. Q. REV. 329 (1993); John Keown, The Legal Revolution: From “Sanctity 
of Life” to “Quality of Life” and “Autonomy,”  14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 253 (1997–
1998).  
 42. For discussion of this issue, see WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS AND THE 
GIFT OF HUMAN LIFE 277–85 (2d. ed. 2008) (explaining the distinction between ordinary 
(proportionate) and extraordinary (disproportionate) treatments). May explains that one “can 
refuse a treatment. . .without adopting by choice a proposal to kill himself or herself. The 
treatment refusal is based on the judgment that the treatment itself, or its side effects or delete-
rious consequences, are so burdensome that undergoing the treatment is not morally obligato-
ry. The treatment in question is truly ‘extraordinary/disproportionate’ since the burdens it im-
poses far exceeds the benefits likely to result from its use.” Id. at 282. In making this judgment, 
“[o]ne does not judge a life excessively burdensome; one judges a treatment excessively burden-
some.” Id. at 283; see also Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 238–39.  
 43. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS, supra note 41, at 285–302. See John S. Howland & 
Peter J. Gummere, Challenging Common Practice in Advanced Dementia Care: A Fresh Look 
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In these cases, the courts often adopted the autonomy perspective 
that later surfaced in Casey and Obergefell. In Brophy, which in-
volved the withdrawal of food and water from a patient in a persistent 
vegetative state, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts relied 
on “the right of self-determination and individual autonomy”44 and in 
so doing specifically relied upon John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty.45 In 
Browning, which involved the withdrawal of food and water from a 
severely disabled patient, the Florida Supreme Court found that the 
“fundamental right of self-determination, commonly expressed as the 
right of privacy, controls this case.”46 In Bouvia, the concurring opin-
ion thought the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration was permissi-
ble even if understood as a suicide, which the concurrence thought 
was in fact at stake.47 The concurrence echoed the majority’s view 
that “a desire to terminate one’s life is probably the ultimate exercise 
of one’s right to privacy”48 and stated that 
The right to die is an integral part of our right to control our own 
destinies so long as the rights of others are not affected. That right 
should, in my opinion, include the ability to enlist the assistance of 
others, including the medical profession, in making death as pain-
less and quick as possible.49 
This celebration of autonomy, even the autonomy to make lethal 
choices, is (as this concurrence makes clear) paving the way to the ac-
ceptance of more active steps to terminate life. Embedding the au-
tonomy rationale in the law is dangerous, as cases from two decades 
ago make clear.  Prior to Glucksberg, several courts relied on the ex-
treme autonomy rationale in Casey to support the view that there ex-
 
at Assisted Nutrition and Hydration, 14 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 53 (2014) (discussing the 
moral issues relating to assisted nutrition and hydration with a particular focus on patients with 
dementia).  
 44. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 633.  
 45. Id. The court stated: “The right of self-determination and individual autonomy has 
its roots deep in our history. John Stuart Mill stated the concept succinctly: ‘[T]he only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to 
do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be 
wise, or even right.’” (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD 271 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952)).   
 46. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990).  
 47. Bouvia v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1146–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) 
(Compton, J., concurring).  
 48. Id. at 1144. 
 49. Id. at 1147 (Compton, J., concurring).  
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isted a fundamental right to die.50 The most prominent example was 
the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Glucksberg,51 which was writ-
ten by Judge Reinhardt, who is often a cultural bellwether on social 
issues.52 Now with Obergefell,53 it seems likely that the Court will 
push the autonomy logic of the withdrawal cases to permit physician 
assisted suicide. 
These cases also reject the idea that the state’s interest in preserv-
ing life can override the patient’s autonomy. In fact, autonomy does 
double duty here. In evaluating the state’s interest in life, the courts 
emphasize that they must defer to the patient’s subjective assessment 
of the value of her life.54  The courts claim that they are not adopting 
a quality of life approach,55 but I don’t think there is any other way to 
read the opinions. In commenting on the Bland case, Peter Singer 
stated that the case marked the collapse of the traditional, sanctity-of-
 
 50. See Richard S. Myers, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Laws Banning Assisted 
Suicide from the Perspective of Catholic Moral Teaching, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 771, 
778–79 (1995) (discussing these cases).  
 51. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F. 3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
After quoting the mystery passage from Casey, Judge Reinhardt stated: “The district judge in 
this case found the Court’s reasoning in Casey ‘highly instructive’ and ‘almost prescriptive’ for 
determining ‘what liberty interest may inhere in a terminally ill person’s choice to commit sui-
cide.’ Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459. We agree.” Id. at 813.   
 52. See Myers, Virtue, supra note 26, at 208–09 (making this point about Judge Rein-
hardt).   
 53. These withdrawal of treatment decisions were decided before Glucksberg and the 
Court in Glucksberg and Quill rejected the idea that these decisions could be extended to sup-
port a right to assisted suicide. The Court in 1997 though seemed keen to issue a restrained 
ruling, perhaps in the wake of Casey and the Court’s abortion decisions. Myers, Roe, supra note 
1, at 1043. Obergefell seems to indicate an increased willingness on the part of the Court to 
venture into new territories (i.e., to find new constitutional rights). This new willingness creates 
the risk that the Court will seize on the principle of autonomy embedded on the law since at 
least the 1980s.  
 54. See Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1142–43. 
 55. In Brophy, the court stated: “[W]e make no judgment based on our own view of the 
value of Brophy’s life, since we do not approve of an analysis of State interests which focuses on 
Brophy’s quality of life. The judge correctly disavowed pronouncing judgment that Brophy’s 
life is not worth preserving.” Brophy v. New England Siani Hosp. In., 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 
(Mass. 1986) (citations omitted). Justice O’Connor’s dissent thought that the majority had in-
deed relied on quality of life concerns. Justice O’Connor stated: “Even in cases involving severe 
and enduring illness, disability and ‘helplessness,’ society’s focus must be on life, not death, with 
dignity. By its very nature, every human life, without reference to its condition, has a value that 
no one rightfully can deny or measure. Recognition of that truth is the cornerstone on which 
American law is built. Society’s acceptance of that fundamental principle explains why, from 
time immemorial, society through law has extended its protection to all, including, especially, 
its weakest and most vulnerable members. The court’s implicit, if not explicit, declaration that 
not every human life has sufficient value to be worthy of the State’s protection denies the digni-
ty of all human life, and undermines the very principle on which American law is constructed.” 
497 N.E.2d at 646 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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life ethic.56 John Keown has noted that although Singer’s comment 
may be overstated, the Bland court did deal a blow to the sanctity-of-
life principle that might prove fatal.57 
The courts refer to severely disabled patients as having “bare ex-
istence”58 or “mere corporeal existence.”59 In fact, in Brophy, the 
court said the “burden of maintaining the corporeal existence de-
grades the very humanity it was meant to serve.”60 It is necessary, the 
courts say, to defer to the patient’s judgment that his life is “degrad-
ing and without human dignity”61 or “meaningless.”62 In Bland, the 
judges stated that there was no benefit to keeping Tony Bland alive.63 
They treated him as already dead.64 Because he lacked certain cogni-
tive abilities, he was effectively a non-person. One of the judges de-
scribed Bland’s condition in this way: “his body is alive, but he has no 
life in the sense that even the most pitifully handicapped but con-
 
 56. PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR 
TRADITIONAL ETHICS 73 (1994). 
 57. Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 255. Keown’s paper contains a good ac-
count of the sanctity of life principle and of the reasons for the prohibition of intentional killing 
an innocent human being. Id. at 256–61.   
 58. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15 (Fla. 1990).  
 59. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 635. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 636. 
 62. Bouvia v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 63. See Finnis, supra note 41, at 333 (“The judges in Bland proceed, of course, on the 
basis that the responsible physician no longer had any duty to prevent Bland’s death. His death 
would be for him no harm or loss. Or as they put it, neither continued life nor the measures 
necessary to keep him alive were of any benefit to him, or in his best interests.”). Another way 
to express this is to say that these patients would be better off dead. One leading academic pro-
ponent of physician assisted suicide states that “many treatment withdrawals reflect an intent to 
die. Patients often refuse life-sustaining treatment because they perceive their life as burden-
some and therefore want to die.” David Orentlicher, The Alleged Distinction Between Eutha-
nasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually Incoherent and Impos-
sible to Maintain, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 837. at 846. According to this scholar, these choices are 
morally justified because “when life becomes sufficiently miserable, a person can reasonably 
believe that continued life is worse than death.” Id. at 851–52. This is, as this scholar quite can-
didly notes, an acceptance of the view that the lives of such patients are “no longer worth liv-
ing,” David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest Revo-
lution, 38 B. C. L. REV. 443, 465 (1997), and that they “would be better off dead” Orentlicher, 
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. at 852.   
 64. In Brophy, Paul Brophy’s wife had decided that “her husband’s ‘life is over[.]’” 497 
N.E.2d at 632. One commentator noted: “But there can be no valid interest in preserving life 
when there is no life left to preserve. A ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications by a 
terminally ill person to hasten that person’s inevitable death does not advance any conceivable 
interest in preserving life.” Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on “Assisted 
Suicide”: The View from Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 777, 790 (1994).   
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scious human being has a life”;65 Bland’s existence was a “humilia-
tion.”66 Justice Stevens said basically the same thing in his Cruzan 
dissent when he noted that 
Nancy Cruzan is obviously ‘alive’ in a physiological sense. But for 
patients like Nancy Cruzan, who have no consciousness and no 
chance of recovery, there is a serious question as to whether the 
mere persistence of their bodies is “life” as that word is commonly 
used in both the Constitution and the Declaration of Independ-
ence.67 
The key though in most of these opinions is that the courts contend 
that they must respect the patient’s subjective choice to consider, as 
the Bouvia court stated, that her “life has been physically destroyed 
and its quality, dignity and purpose gone[.]”68 It seems, too, that the 
courts often endorse the quality of life philosophy reflected, although 
the opinions typically, in the end, defer to the subjective wishes of the 
patient. As one of the Brophy dissents commented, under this reason-
ing, “it necessarily follows that the young as well as the old, the 
healthy as well as the sick, and the firm as well as the infirm, without 
exception, have the right to commit suicide, and that others have the 
right to participate in that act.”69 
These older withdrawal of treatment cases do, typically, say that 
they are not approving a right to die or a right to suicide.70 The cases 
 
 65. Bland, supra note  41, at 850; Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 271 (quot-
ing this and similar descriptions).   
 66. Finnis, supra note 41, at 336 (the judges accept the view that “Bland’s continued ex-
istence was not merely no benefit but actually a harm to him, a source of indignity, violation of 
his wish to be remembered well, humiliation).  Anthony Fisher aptly commented that “[i]n 
Bland’s case . . . the judges have made a radical departure from this traditional ethic and law, 
allowing that tube-feeding be withdrawn not because of the futility or burdensome of the so-
called treatment, but because Tony Bland’s continued life was a source of indignity and humili-
ation to him, a violation of how he would want to be remembered, and an ordeal for others.”; 
see Anthony Fisher, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Moral and Philosophical Dilemmas in Death and 
Dying, Address at the Symposium on Death and Dying (Oct. 15, 1994), 
https://www.ewtn.com/library/PROLIFE/KILLET.TXT.  
 67. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 345 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). 
 68. Bouvia v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 69. Brophy, 497 N. E. 2d at 645 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  
 70. In Bouvia, for example, the court stated that Elizabeth’s “decision to allow nature to 
take its course is not equivalent to an election to commit suicide . . . .”  Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 
3d at 1144. The concurring judge thought that it was clear that Elizabeth Bouvia’s death would 
be a suicide, which the judge thought should be allowed. The judge stated: “I have no doubt 
that Elizabeth Bouvia wants to die, and if she had the full use of even one hand, could probably 
find a way to end her life—in a word—commit suicide. In order to seek the assistance which she 
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say they are not permitting active steps to terminate lives but are only 
allowing passive steps (omissions) that allow nature to take its 
course.71 But in cases such as Brophy and Bland, this doesn’t seem ac-
curate. The withdrawal of food and water (although passive, an omis-
sion) is done with the intent to end the life of the patient. A majority 
of the judges in Bland explicitly stated that the withdrawal of food 
and water was done with the intent to terminate Tony Bland’s life.72 
As one of the Brophy dissents stated, 
Paul Brophy will die as a direct result of the cessation of feeding. 
The ethical principle of double effect is totally inapplicable here. 
This death by dehydration and starvation has been approved by the 
court. He will not die from the aneurysm which precipitated his loss 
of consciousness, the surgery which was performed, the brain dam-
age that followed or the insertion of the G-tube. He will die as a di-
rect result of the refusal to feed him. He will starve to death, and 
the court approves his death.73 
There is a practical line here, between active and passive steps, be-
tween acts and omissions. But this has never been regarded as dispos-
itive by the law.74 As Justice Scalia noted in his Cruzan concurrence, 
“in the prosecution of a parent for the starvation death of her infant, 
it was no defense that the infant’s death was ‘caused’ by not action of 
the parent but by the natural process of starvation, or by the infant’s 
natural inability to provide for itself.”75 As St. Pope John Paul II 
commented, “death by starvation or dehydration is, in fact, the only 
possible outcome as a result of the withdrawal [of food and water]. In 
 
needs in ending her life by the only means she sees available—starvation—she has had to stulti-
fy her position before this court by disavowing her desire to end her life in such a fashion and 
proclaiming that she will eat all that she can physically tolerate. Even the majority opinion here 
must necessarily ‘dance’ around the issue. Elizabeth apparently has made a conscious and in-
formed choice that she prefers death to continued existence in her helpless and, to her, intoler-
able condition. I believe she has an absolute right to effectuate that decision. This state and the 
medical profession, instead of frustrating her desire, should be attempting to relieve her suffer-
ing by permitting and in fact assisting her to die with ease and dignity. The fact that she is 
forced to suffer the ordeal of self-starvation to achieve her objective is in itself inhumane.” 179 
Cal. App. 3d at 1146–47 (Compton, J., concurring). 
 71. See Brophy, 497 N. E. 2d at 439; In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 14 
(Fla. 1990).  
 72. Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note 41, at 254 (“in the express opinion of a majori-
ty of their Lordships, the doctor’s intent was to kill.”).  
 73. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 442 (Nolan, J., dissenting).  
 74. See Keown, Legal Revolution, supra note  41, at 258.  
 75. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 297 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).  
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this sense it ends up becoming, if done knowingly and willingly, true 
and proper euthanasia by omission.”76 
The troubling aspect of these cases is that they accept withdrawal 
even if done with the express intent to terminate a life. In cases such 
as Bland and Brophy, the withdrawals are not justified because the 
treatment is burdensome but because the patient’s life is a burden or 
is thought to be worthless.77 
The withdrawal cases show that extreme autonomy and the quali-
ty of life ethic have been embedded in the law for some time now. 
The decline of the sanctity of life ethic can be seen in other contexts 
as well. The current move to increase prenatal screening for Downs 
Syndrome is just one example.78  I think this decline can also be seen 
in the recent New Mexico litigation involving that state’s ban on as-
sisted suicide. In that case, the state did not defend the law by assert-
ing an interest in life.79 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Now, with Obergefell (reaffirming the autonomy rationale), and 
with other cultural trends, it seems increasingly likely that the Court 
 
 76. See Richard S. Myers, Reflections on the Terri Schindler-Schiavo Controversy, XIV 
LIFE & LEARNING 39, n.99 (quoting Pope John Paul II, “Address to the Participants in the In-
ternational Congress on Life-Sustaining Treatments and the Vegetative State: Scientific Ad-
vances and Ethical Dilemmas” (Mar. 20, 2004)), http://www.uffl.org/Vol14/myers-04.pdf.  
 77. The dissents in Brophy discussed this point at some length. See Brophy, 497 N. E. 
2d at 642–43 (Lynch, J., dissenting in part); Id. at 643–46 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). Justice O’Connor, for example, emphasized that the lower court explicitly 
found that the decision to withdraw food and water was not due to the burdensome of the 
treatment but was rather based on the view, as Justice O’Connor put it, that “life in any event is 
not worth living and its continuation is intolerable.” Id. at 644 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  In commenting on the bland case, John Keown noted that “it was 
Bland’s life, and not his tube-feeding, that was adjudged worthless” Keown, Legal Revolution, 
supra note 41, at 272.  
 78. See  Robert McFarland, Life Worthy of Life: Down Syndrome, Equality, and My 
Son Silas, THE WITHERSPOON INSTITUTE (Oct. 26, 2016), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/10/18123/ for a forceful reflection on these issues. 
 79. The New Mexico Supreme Court emphasized three state interests in support of its 
law banning assisted suicide— (1) an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profes-
sion; (2) an interest in protecting vulnerable groups from abuse, neglect and mistakes; and (3) 
an interest in avoiding a progression to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. The Court didn’t 
rely on the state’s interest in protecting the life of the person who wanted to commit suicide, 
even though that interest had been important in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. at 728–
30 (discussing the state’s interest in the preservation of life). Perhaps tellingly, the New Mexico 
court described this interest in this way—”The State concedes that it does not have an interest 
in preserving a painful and debilitating life that will end imminently.” Morris v. Brandenburg, 
376 P.3d at 855.  
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will overrule Glucksberg. In 1997, state laws and the views of estab-
lishment organizations (e.g., American Medical Association) were 
largely arrayed against recognition of a right to physician assisted sui-
cide.80 Now, the trends seem to be moving slowly in favor of allowing 
assisted suicide. Some medical associations have dropped their oppo-
sition to physician assisted suicide.81 Even the AMA is considering 
whether to take a neutral position on this issue.82 In his dissent in 
Obergefell, Justice Alito commented that the only real constraint on 
the Court’s power is a majority of the Court’s “own sense of what 
those with political power and cultural influence are willing to toler-
ate.”83 In 1997, the Court was unwilling to extend substantive due 
process to protect the right to die. But the legal and cultural situation 
has changed sufficiently so that it seems likely that a majority of the 
Court will be willing to extend the autonomy rationale it relied upon 
in Obergefell to protect physician assisted suicide. 
This is by no means inevitable.84 Because the Court has not yet 
intervened to “resolve” this controversy,85 opponents of assisted sui-
cide still have the opportunity to advance their views and to rebuild 
the sanctity of life norm. 
 
 
 
 80. In Glucksberg, the Court noted that “the American Medical Association, like many 
other medical and physicians’ groups, has concluded that ‘[p]hysician-assisted suicide is funda-
mentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 731 (1997) (quoting American Medical Association, Code of Ethics section 2.211 
(1994)).  
 81. A handbook prepared by a leading right to die group notes the importance of the 
views of medical associations in influencing the debate on this issue. Medical Aid in Dying: A 
Handbook for Engaging State Medical Associations, COMPASSION & CHOICES, 
https://www.compassionandchoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/C-C-State-Medical-
Association-Handbook-FINAL-8.26.16-Approved-for-Public-Distribution.pdf (last visited 
2/1/17).  
 82. Fr. Mark Hodges, American Medical Association Approves Resolution to ‘Study’ 
Assisted Suicide, LIFE SITE (June 21, 2016, 9:30 PM), 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/american-medical-association-approves-resolution-to-
study-assisted-suicide.  
 83. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2643 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 84. Much depends on the Court’s personnel at the time the issue is considered.  
 85. The Court sometimes claims that its decisions “resolve” social controversies. But, as 
the continuing resistance to the Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade and Casey indicate, this is not 
an accurate account of the impact of the Court’s rulings. See Myers, Virtue, supra note 26, at 
211 (discussing this in the context of abortion).   
